PATHWAYS project

‘Implementation’ as Conditioned Experimenting:
Sustainable Transport and Greater Manchester

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WP3 Case Study

Mike Hodson

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‘Implementation’ as Conditioned Experimenting: Sustainable Transport and Greater Manchester

Background of the Initiative and Overview, including Methods.

Greater Manchester has positioned itself as a leader in the UK in sustainable transport, responsible for ‘the largest transport infrastructure investment programme outside London’ (GMCA/TfGMC, 2013), but where there is an ‘overall lack of municipal and regional institutional capacity in urban and climate planning’ (MacKillop, 2012, p.249).

With this in mind, this case study looks at the implementation of a suite of nationally funded sustainable transport projects in Greater Manchester. In addressing these projects, the case study brings two issues together to address the capacity gap set out above: (1) which governance interests shape the kinds of sustainable transport projects that are being experimented with locally, and (2) how these projects are locally implemented and embedded. The case illustrates that it is national governance interests who set strong conditions for what kinds of local transport projects are developed and how they are implemented. Subsequently local processes of implementation of these projects are experimented with but are constrained by these national conditions. This raises a critical issue of what it is we mean by local experimentation, when it is physically distant interests who are shaping such initiatives.

Drawing on a suite of sustainable transport projects in Greater Manchester, but particularly cycling hub infrastructure, the case study details five lessons:

1) There was recognition across a wide range of national, city-level and local governance interests that the implementation of sustainable transport projects in Greater Manchester was an ‘experimental’ process.

2) There was a broadly shared view that the ability of city and local governance actors to exercise discretion in local processes of implementing cycling projects was limited by prior commitments that had been made to national government.

3) Though there was strategic thinking linking these different sustainable transport projects together at city level, sometimes in implementation projects suffered from weak coordination with each other.

4) There was a lack of overall understanding of how experimental and fluid processes of implementation of sustainable transport projects took place.

5) Though there were processes ‘evaluating’ sustainable transport projects, and there were lessons learned, capturing the learning from the wide range of different projects and governance interests and using mechanisms to feed this back into future decision-making was limited.

In short, there are under-developed institutional mechanisms for capturing learning about sustainable transport at a local Greater Manchester level. What this tells us is that whilst there is significant local experimentation on sustainable transport in Greater Manchester there needs to be more effective ways of learning from this learning. Though it is sustainable transport projects that are presented as innovations in Greater Manchester, perhaps it is institutional innovation to capture the learning from local experimentation that is missing.
**Approach**  
The case study uses the threefold framework for WP3 (see Appendix 1) to set out:

- The Gestation of sustainable transport projects and transport governance in Greater Manchester.
- The Development of plans for tangible sustainable transport projects.
- The Implementation of one (among the many highlighted above) local sustainable cycling hub project to illustrate the ways in which a local project is Implemented.

Many aspects of the case have long histories but the specific timeline of the case is set out in Appendix 2.

The cycle hub initiative specifically intended to encourage greater cycle commuting. From that point of view it promotes an alternative to dominant modes of commuting in Greater Manchester. Yet, it is promoted by the incumbent transport authority, Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM), collaborating with a dominant property owner in the city (Pathway A). In addition to the key actor being the incumbent transport authority there has been some consultative involvement of cycling and sustainability groups. Yet, the focus of transformation in the cycle hub example is not on substitution or replacement but rather is to attempt to link an intervention in new cycling infrastructure to a wider attempt to build greater use of cycling as a commuter mode (Pathway B). The implementation of the hub was achieved reasonably rapidly (Pathway A). Yet, in terms of its effects as an intervention that contributes to a deeper cultural change in commuter cycling patterns this is difficult to assess as it is part of more systemic change. It is also likely to be some time before this kind of change can be effectively assessed (Pathway B). Although it is possible to set out how many users of the hub there are and to make assessments of the numbers of commuter journeys they ‘replace’ (Pathway A) the kinds of broader changes envisaged in the aims of the cycle hub, contributing to 10% modal share for cycling by 2025 in Greater Manchester, are much more difficult to assess (Pathway B). This suggests that there is a ‘gap’ between the tangible development of infrastructure and changing practices.

**Methods**  
The case study brings two issues together: (1) which governance interests shape the kinds of sustainable transport projects that are being experimented with locally, and (2) how these projects are locally implemented and embedded. The case illustrates that it is national governance interests who set strong conditions for the kinds of local transport projects and how they are implemented. Subsequently local processes of implementation of these projects are experimented with but are constrained by these national conditions. This raises a critical issue of what it is we mean by *local* experimentation, when it is physically distant interests who are shaping such initiatives.

The case study was organised in line with the framework and questions set out by the WP3 coordinators. The questions can be found in Appendix 1. A proforma (see Appendix 3), designed by the WP3 leaders, was also used to generate material. The case study used a mix of methods.

- First, a wide range of policy and strategy documents were drawn from across the Greater Manchester transport and governing agencies. These were accessed as were relevant national documents. These addressed the longer-term development of
priorities for sustainable transport in Greater Manchester, the governance of transport in Greater Manchester and the development of local initiatives. Many of the documents are referred to in the Reference section of this report.

- These kinds of strategy and policy documents present particular representations of sustainable transport, governance arrangements and local projects. To ‘get inside’ of these representations a small programme of 10 interviews was undertaken with key interests across the governance context and the different initiatives. These interviews involved both ‘formal’ governance actors and critics. Each interview lasted for at least one hour and often much longer. Many of the interviewees spoke on condition of anonymity. On this basis, specific reference to individuals is not made, though broad characterisation of a person’s position is referred to to provide some context to quotes.

- Relevant academic literatures were also drawn upon. In particular, the case drew on and synthesised three literatures to develop a framework for understanding. First, to recognise the role of existing local transport contexts, urban governance literature was utilised to understand how transport priorities are mediated through particular ‘local’ institutional and governance frameworks (Hendriks, 2013). Second and third, locally embedding these initiatives involve efforts to configure technology, various local interests and expectations often in circumstances of uncertainty. To address this literature around experimental governance (Bulkeley and Castan Broto, 2013) and niche analysis (Verbong et al, 2008; Raven and Geels, 2010) were engaged with.
In-detail description of the case:

In this section the development of the case is set-out in detail. It follows the threefold structure (Gestation, Development and Implementation) set out in the case study protocol. As suggested in the protocol, the questions from the protocol are not used prescriptively but are used to help orientate the case study. This being so, footnotes are used in the text to identify where case study material corresponds to particular questions raised in the protocol.


The Local Sustainable Transport Fund (LSTF) project in Greater Manchester was part of a bid to national government in two phases: 2011 and 2012. The motivations for the bid have deep historical roots going back to the 1980s and beyond. That said, the Gestation phase of the initiative can be understood in the time period from 2009 until the first bid in 2011.

The transport system in Greater Manchester is supported by complicated governance arrangements that have evolved over a forty year period. These arrangements, in summary, have been shaped by the relationship between national government and the Greater Manchester tier of governing: most notably the abolition by national government of formal metropolitan governing institutions in 1986, the subsequent building of voluntary cooperation at a Greater Manchester level, and a move, from around 2009 to formalising these governing arrangements.

In 2009, greater powers were devolved to Greater Manchester over economic development, skills, housing and transport. At this time strategic decisionmakers in Greater Manchester identified ‘a need to establish a step change in the quality and image of public transport to help reduce the need to travel by private car by substantially increasing accessibility by sustainable modes of travel’ (AGMA, 2009, p.7).

Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) was established in April 2011. Control over transport became the overall responsibility of GMCA, delegated to a new implementation body, Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM). TfGM is responsible for transport in Greater Manchester (though this varies depending on transport mode). The transport system in Greater Manchester is constituted by multiple transport networks, including over 9,000km of roads, a bus network carrying around 225 million passengers annually, a light rail system, which is in the midst of a significant expansion of the network, carries around 28 million passengers a year and a rail network that accounts for more than 22 million journeys annually (see Greater Manchester Combined Authority/Transport for Greater Manchester, 2011; Warriner, 2014).

There are a variety of issues that created pressures for transformation of the Greater Manchester transport system in the Gestation period. These can be summarised as:

- Framing public transport as an economic growth issue: where the public transport debate in Greater Manchester was aligned with national pressures for economic growth in key governance and transport strategies such as the Greater Manchester Strategy of 2009 and the Local Transport Plan in 2011.

1 See also http://www.gmcc.org.uk/2012/03/fender-bends-rules-to-reveal-small-march-2012/ [accessed 19/12/2014]
Increasing volume of commuter travel: The trend of morning peak car journeys in to Manchester city centre reduced by around 15 per cent in the decade to 2011, while commuting numbers overall increased and there was a shift to public transport, walking and cycling, creating strain on public transport systems (GMCA/TfGM, 2011).

Reducing carbon emissions from transport: Following the setting of statutory UK carbon reduction targets, the Greater Manchester’s 2011 Climate Change Strategy (GMCCS, 2011) set a non-binding target of a 48 per cent reduction in carbon emissions by 2020. This requires direct CO2 emissions reductions from the Greater Manchester area. It has been claimed that carbon emissions from transport are responsible for more than 30 per cent of total direct emissions in Greater Manchester (GMCCS Implementation Plan). An interim reduction target for 2015 (695kt) was set out for ‘road transport’.

Reducing local authority spending: Within this mix of systemic, economic and environmental pressures, since the financial crisis of 2007/8 there have been national political pressures for significant reductions in local authority spending. This translated to pressures that resulted in significant reductions in ‘influencible’ expenditure (operating costs, reductions in staffing in particular and subsidised services).²

It is within this context that sustainable transport priorities were set out in 2011 in Greater Manchester’s third Local Transport Plan (LTP3), for a four year period (2011/12-2015/16) as part of a 15 year strategy. The plan - a statutory commitment - was developed by the forerunner to TfGM. This was done through consultation with the 10 Greater Manchester local authorities and with ‘relevant stakeholders’. In the governance changes that took place in 2011, TfGM monitors and reviews the plan on a ‘regular basis’. There was a consultation exercise, receiving over 900 responses, in October and December 2010 and a dedicated seminar attended by over 100 community and local business representatives. The focus of LTP3 became defined around three concepts: People, Purpose and Place. The first of these to address which communities would be the focus of intervention (local commuters and job seekers), the second to understand their ‘travel needs’ (through data from TfGM commuter consultation and attitude surveys), and third to assess the location of such communities and where they need to travel to³.

The development of the strategy in LTP3 involved relationships ‘upwards’, between Greater Manchester bodies and national government, new ‘protocols’ for working between Greater Manchester and national departments and agencies being developed; relationships ‘downwards’ between TfGM and Local Highway Authorities, for example, or between the strategic priorities of Greater Manchester and local transport schemes and maintenance; and relationships ‘horizontally,’ given the new transport governance architecture and also linkages that are being promoted between transport and economy, transport and health and transport and environment⁴.

The gestation phase saw the development of a strategy - Local Transport Plan (LTP3) - and the need to fund the LTP3. The central goals were to:

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² This addresses 1.2. And 1.3
³ 1.4
⁴ 1.7
• Set out Greater Manchester’s transport spending plans and priorities for a four year period to 2015 as part of a 15 year strategy.
• To improve public transport options, particularly for short journeys, to reduce car use and to link this to access to work and other commuter sites.

The search for funding for Greater Manchester’s key transport priorities requires aligning these priorities with available funding streams.

2. Development period (2011-2012)
This leads us to the Development phase (2011-2012). There is not a clean break between Gestation and Development with some overlap.

National government in 2011 set out a £560 million Local Sustainable Transport Fund (LSTF) which sought local responses that promoted greater use of public transport, walking and cycling. Central to the LSTF was a merging of different agendas: primarily economic growth but also addressing decarbonisation and climate change and increasing physical activity (Department for Transport, 2013).

Greater Manchester (through GMCA) submitted a large project bid to the LSTF in June 2011. The bid sought to address commuter congestion and getting people to work - particularly from economically deprived areas - whilst also reducing carbon emissions and pollution. Greater Manchester requested £45m of LSTF monies and set out £22m of local contributions for its bid (TfGM, 2011a). Just prior to this large project bid, Greater Manchester had also applied for a smaller, £4.9m project, Key Component commuter cycling project as part of LSTF, which was successful in July 2011.

The claim from Greater Manchester decisionmakers was that the project funding would add £28m annually to GVA and that this would ‘create the equivalent of 900 jobs’ and that 26m km of commuter car journeys would be replaced by 10 million extra public transport journeys and two million cycling trips (TfGM, undated).

The process of bidding for LSTF was governed by a timetable set nationally by the Department for Transport (DfT). The Greater Manchester initiative was one of 19 expressions of interest, by June 2011, for large projects. Following assessment nationally, a shortlist of 13 was set out to prepare Large Project Business cases by December 2011 (Department for Transport, 2013) and TfGM was asked to undertake a ‘full review’ of its bid (TfGM Committee, 2012a). This was to ensure a fit between the bid and LSTF objectives, particularly the role of local economic activity in the bid, short-term economic benefit and getting people back to work, ‘value for money’ and the level of funding requested. This review was undertaken by TfGM and other partners within the supervisory governance framework of TfGM Committee and GMCA and also through dialogue with the DfT’s LSTF.

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5 1.5
6 2.1
7 2.2, 2.3, 2.4
8 For the LSTF initiative there were three tranches of funding. The first two tranches covered smaller projects (up to £5m). In the first tranche, announced in July 2011, Greater Manchester received £4.938 million for a Commuter Cycle Project, which was a smaller Key Component project. Larger projects (between £5m and £50m) formed the third tranche, announced in June 2012.
9 2.8
project officials (TfGM Committee, 2012a; Greater Manchester Environment Commission, 2012). The revised bid was endorsed in November by Greater Manchester’s governance arrangements. The bid also received support from stakeholders from bus operators to community cycling groups (TfGM Committee, 2012a,b). The submission totalled over 500 pages including annexes. The DfT’s review of the proposals was undertaken by specialists within the Department. An Expert Panel was also convened to review the proposals and where all Large Project bidders were interviewed by the Expert Panel and Departmental Officials in February 2012. In June 2012 funding was granted for 12 Large Projects, of which Greater Manchester’s was one (Department for Transport, 2013). This amounted to £32.4 million of funding in relation to the LSTF with additional local contributions of over £20m. This was in addition to the first tranche of £4.9 of LSTF funding.

The Greater Manchester proposal consisted of four components in addition to the previously submitted fifth component. These are:

1. Developing sustainable access to key destinations and transport hubs. Practically this means to develop short-distance access between deprived neighbourhoods, local employment centres and key transport stations through improvements to cycling and walking routes across Greater Manchester.

2. A supporting sustainable choices component of the initiative aimed to provide services and information ‘to help ensure the optimal use of the transport network, new services and facilities’. A number of different measures were proposed from marketing material to Travel Choices training for Jobcentre staff to share this information with jobseekers and working with local businesses.

3. A smarter travel component of the project addresses elements including part-funding a smart ticketing initiative, bus priority through an active travel management system, also automatic vehicle location data to support road network efficiency and passenger real-time information by web or mobile apps to plan and re-plan journeys in light of disruptions and the procurement of a central data management system.

4. The fourth component focused on developing capacity for community transport to build access between areas of deprivation and local employment, providing transport services where conventional bus services would not normally be provided on the grounds of being uneconomic.

5. The forerunner element promoted commuter cycling through cycle training and information and infrastructure elements including membership-based cycle hubs that would include secure cycle parking, lockers, toilets, showers and changing cubicles and also cycle compounds for commuter cyclists at, for example, rail and bus stations.

The key points of the Development phase are as follows:

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10 2.5
11 2.4
12 2.9
Give limited institutional capacity and resources in Greater Manchester, securing funding and building capacity to act in the Development phase were central to trying to translate the strategic priorities of the Gestation phase. This meant (1) securing funding from the primary national funding mechanism in this area the Local Sustainable Transport Fund (LSTF) and (2) developing a bid and coalition of interests to do so.

The priorities set out in the Gestation period were packaged into a programme of tangible activities through the LSTF funding. There had to be some selection as to what kinds of tangible activities were to be funded. The LSTF money selectively funded a number of activities across the five themes but a large amount of the funding was used in relation to cycling infrastructure and cycling training. Active travel, in 2011, had limited capacity to act in Greater Manchester. This was even more the case than with buses, trams and other modes of transport where there was some institutional capacity in Greater Manchester. A significant part of the LSTF funding became used for cycling infrastructure and training.


TfGM had responsibility for overseeing implementation of the LSTF funding in Greater Manchester from 2012. The specific end point for implementation depended on the particular local initiative or project being implemented as part of the wider funding programme. That said, the LSTF funding is until 2015\(^{13}\). The five elements of work (set out in the Development phase) each contained numerous initiatives which were to be delivered either (a) by partners, (b) by TfGM or (c) through combinations of TfGM and partners. Each element of the LSTF funding involved numerous local interventions, and within them, each specific intervention involved a range of actors which would be configured in relation to an intervention. Across the interventions this involved a range of interests that included: Local Authorities, Network Rail, Northern Rail, British Waterways, the Ramblers Association, local cycle groups, businesses, Job Centres, Bus Operating Companies, Train Operating Companies, Highways Agency, Greater Manchester Community Transport Operators Forum and various others\(^{14}\).

Below, we set out an example, primarily from the fifth component of LSTF funding, to illustrate the dynamics of local implementation.

The fifth element of the LSTF funding, at £4.9m, focused on a Commuter Cycling Project. TfGM assumed strategic responsibilities for active travel, including cycling, in 2011. Beginning with limited internal capacity, overall LSTF cycling-related funding amounted to around £23m. A separate Cycle City Ambition Grant from national government in 2013 added a further £20m. Additionally there are other smaller pots of funding for cycling in Greater Manchester. This funding contributes to infrastructure projects that include creating a network of cycle routes (a strategic priority in Greater Manchester, see Figure 1) particularly connecting employment, leisure and education sites and improved and secure cycle parking facilities at rail and transport interchanges.

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\(^{13}\) 3.1

\(^{14}\) 3.2
At a Greater Manchester level, particularly given that strategic responsibility only came in 2011, there is recognition of the need for agreed standards and a unified approach to cycling infrastructure. Aside from infrastructure and a network of cycle paths there is work on cycle training and information campaigns. This all contributes to the aim that between 2013 and 2025 the proportion of trips by bicycle in Greater Manchester should ‘double and double again’ or a 300% increase and a 10% mode share by 2025 (GMCA/TfGMC, 2014).

Within these wider priorities the Commuter Cycling project contributed cycle training and also the creation of cycle hubs at rail stations and interchanges in different parts of Greater Manchester, with a regional centre in Manchester. Around £2.5m of funding was capital spending for infrastructure, with the focus on hubs. The rationale for this was set out by someone with close knowledge of the process: ‘We took the view that if the existing provision of cycling wasn’t attractive, what could we do that would really make it attractive? To do that we came up with these two sorts of cycle hubs’. Numbers of hubs aimed for have varied but appear to be between 10 and 13. By 2014 smaller hubs were operating in Rochdale,
Ashton-Under Lyne and Bury with a large, regional hub in central Manchester at the City Tower in Piccadilly Gardens, which opened in November 201215.

Perhaps the key issue following the awarding of funding is how such initiatives are made concrete and tangible. The issue for TfGM in relation to cycling was how to start to build capacity to act in an area they had not historically had responsibility for. This is where TfGM found itself in 2011. There was a very steep learning curve according to a view from close to the transport authority: ‘If I’m honest, there was a lot of learning going on here, we were not an organisation that historically had a skill set in cycling, we had to learn that skill set quite quickly’. From a cycling advocate viewpoint, TfGM being given a strategic role for cycling ‘was good and we supported it. In a sense be careful what you wish for because they had no experience yet they just assumed they did. Some of the conflicts that we got into were because they were not talking to people who had been doing this sort of stuff either voluntarily or professionally for decades’. And from a representative of another cycling organisation, the sense was that: ‘It has taken them some time to find their feet and almost to find a sense of direction, but having done that, I think they’re making very big steps in the right direction’16.

Making Spaces of Sustainable Transport
The City Tower hub provides around 200 cycle spaces in the basement of City Tower (see Figure 2) in central Manchester and houses changing rooms, showers, lockers, a bicycle maintenance and sales shop and is accessed through an electronic, swipe card. It operates on the basis of a paid-membership scheme where a premium membership (cycle parking, locker and showers) is £200 a year or £10 a month. A standard membership (cycle parking and a small locker) is £100 a year or £10 a month, both purchasable online. On the standard package there is a pay as you go option of 10 visits for £10. The hub is available seven days a week, between 6am to 8pm Monday to Friday and 8am to 5pm at weekend. The hub was primarily a collaboration between TfGM as the transport authority and Bruntwood as the property owner17.

Figure 2: City Tower

Source: Manchester Evening News

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15 3.12
16 3.3, 3.4
17 3.10, 3.9
In governance terms this was a public-private partnership. Though other groups fed into development, the decision on siting of the hub and its constituent features were largely a product of the partnership. There was some pragmatism in terms of where the hub was located, according to somebody with close knowledge of that decision: ‘There are pros and cons of this but to get city centre space, right in the heart of the city centre where there is an enormous catchment area within a short distance around City Tower, would be very expensive if you were paying commercial rent for that, so there are compromises sometimes to be made here’.

The design of hubs was informed by ‘saddle surveys, or handlebar surveys’ ‘of all the bikes that we could find parked around Greater Manchester’. This approach aimed to understand trip purpose, distance, gender and willingness to pay for ‘certain types of facilities’. This informed thinking of the types of hub to be developed: (1) a small number of larger, regional hubs with showers, changing and lockers and (2) district hubs for shorter trips which were more basic facilities for leaving bikes securely.

For Bruntwood, as the property owner, their role was based on a sense of corporate social responsibility and similarly they were seen by others in terms of ‘their environmental credentials are important’ to them. Practically this meant providing basement space in their City Tower Building in central Manchester and also ‘a commercial agreement’ between TfGM and Bruntwood ‘about the proportional split of costs and how the costs and revenues are split’.

*Envisaging and Achieving Intervention*
Greater Manchester’s bid for LSTF funding for the hubs came before substantial design and development of the infrastructure and thus some infrastructure was the subject of design and location after the funding had been won. According to a cycle group representative in Greater Manchester: ‘There was a big bun fight over the amount of money they spent on the one [cycle hub] in the city centre and also the design elements of it. Again, they put the bid in without designing anything, there wasn’t time...they didn’t have time to design it, they didn’t even know where they were going to go’.

The City Tower hub is accessed through an underground car park through the same entrance as cars enter the car park (see Figure 3). There is also access at this entrance for disabled users, with lift access adjacent to the entrance and another pedestrian access.
Following entrance cyclists make their way through the car park following green painted cycle lanes and wall mounted signage. With access to the hub itself through a smart card protected entrance, with a pedestrian access/exit to Piccadilly Gardens.

On entering the hub there is a workshop of the Edinburgh Bicycle Cooperative who are available to repair and maintain bikes. Moving in to the hub there is Tricycle and Tandem parking and a lift for disabled users to lower levels. There are also rails for running bikes down steps. In the hub there is also a training room facility.
Within the hub there are lines of vertical cycle racks. There was some disagreement at the design stage between the proposed use of vertical rather than horizontal bike racks. Cycling groups suggested that: ‘We told them we didn’t like their design…they were saying, “We’ve told DfT [national government] we’ve got to get a certain number of spaces in.” It’s like, “you haven’t even picked the bloody sites so why are you going, ‘we’ve got to get a certain number in?’ you might only have half the space”’. The objection was on the basis of both the difficulty of users struggling with a heavy bike to use the racks easily and also a view that the use of such stands would contribute to brake and hear cables being ripped.

**Figure 5: Vertical Bike Racks**

There were toilet, shower and changing facilities. These were behind swipe card secure doors for premium members. At the time of a research visit, there was very little sign of life and use in the women’s changing room. The men’s changing room looked well used. There was clearly a gender split in use both in terms of visual impressions and also in discussions with interviewees. This is perhaps not surprising given the location in a dark, subterranean space, accessed via a car ramp, through a car park, with vertical bike stands. Membership at the time of research stood at around 130 with daily use probably only around one-third of that number. Where according to somebody with close knowledge of the facility ‘it’s quite puzzling given the cost, as to why people are happy to pay that amount and yet use it not on a daily basis’.
Since the initial design there have been a number of amendments. Initially, many users, on the basis of commuting to work, found the lockers to be too small. These were supplemented subsequently with full length lockers within which people could hang their clothes.

Users were expected to bring their own locks to secure the bikes to racks. Additionally as many locks were too short to attach to the stands TfGM had added flex to adapt the racks.
Whether this was seen as a process of incremental design and experimentation or poor planning depends on which interests are discussing this. Outside of the partnership between TfGM and Bruntwood there were a variety of perspectives, including some, such as a local authority representative, with a sense that the design of the hub was problematic: ‘I don’t think the City Tower is a success story’.

Within Greater Manchester in terms of the implementation of cycling infrastructure and the cycling hubs specifically, there are different designs as some cycling hubs are being funded through national LSTF funding and others through national government funding to the rail franchise for the area, Northern Rail. This means that the coalition of interests seeking to feed their view into the design of cycle hubs generally included TfGM, Bruntwood and other site owners, Northern Rail, cycling campaigns groups, sustainable transport charities and the Greater Manchester local authorities. In the development of hubs there have been specific configurations of these interests and others. One result is that Northern Rail’s cycle hubs are being designed differently from the ones through TfGM. The aspiration is that there will be inter-operability through the same swipe card.

4. Summary/Synthesis

The case study brings two issues together: (1) which governance interests shape the kinds of sustainable transport projects that are being experimented with locally, and (2) how these projects are locally implemented and embedded. The case illustrates that it is national governance interests who set strong conditions for the kinds of local transport projects and how they are implemented. Subsequently local processes of implementation of these projects are experimented with but are constrained by these national conditions. This raises a critical issue of what it is we mean by local experimentation, when it is physically distant interests who are shaping such initiatives.

Many of the interventions of the national LSTF funding (e.g. cycle hubs, cycle training, bus priority lanes etc) are ongoing. Some continue or are being added to through new sources of

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18 3.6, 3.7, 3.11
funding. The LSTF funding specifically, though, ends in 2015. In terms of whether the LSTF programme in Greater Manchester proved to be ‘feasible’ different elements of the programme have illustrated varying levels of feasibility. Rather than feasibility it is perhaps helpful to discuss issues and lessons learned. Taking the development of cycle hubs specifically, the following issues are important to note:

1) There was recognition across a wide range of national, city-level and local interests that the implementation of sustainable transport projects was an ‘experimental’ process. The quotes below are indicative of this.

‘A lot of it [Greater Manchester cycling projects] is experimental at the moment’ (transport authority representative).

‘There’s an element of experimentation here…the proof of the pudding would be the success of the hubs’. (cycling activist).

‘we would almost suggest to run this as a pilot to see how it works…because there doesn’t seem to be much in the way of comparable evidence for it…as a pilot project I think there are lessons to be learnt from it’. (cycling infrastructure expert).

What is notable in the example of experimentation with the cycle hub is that this form of experimentation involved a small public-private partnership at its core with some processes of consultation with other cycling and local authority interests.

2) There was a broadly common view that the ability of city and local governance actors to exercise discretion in the design and implementation process was limited by prior commitments to national government.

This was in many ways as the bidding process to national government for funding came prior to the design of infrastructure. This is captured in the words of a local cycle group representative:

‘There was a big bun fight over the amount of money they spent on the one [cycle hub] in the city centre and also the design elements of it. Again, they put the bid in without designing anything, there wasn’t time…they didn’t have time to design it, they didn’t even know where they were going to go’.

This resulted in a view that the ‘promises’ made to national government limited subsequent discretion in design and implementation processes. For local cycle groups:

‘We told them [TfGM] we didn’t like their design…they [TfGM] were saying, “We’ve told DfT you’ve got to get a certain number of spaces in.” It’s like, “you haven’t even picked the bloody sites so why are you going, we’ve got to get a certain number in?” you might only have half the space”’.

For a number of interests, the results of this approach were similar to those of a local authority official:

‘Some of the designs were just abysmal, it’s like, “Who is that for?”’.
3) Though there was strategic thinking linking these different sustainable transport projects together at city level, sometimes in implementation these projects suffered from weak coordination with each other.

This tension, where strategic transport priorities at a Greater Manchester level were conditioned by national priorities and funding streams was seen by somebody with a long experience of Greater Manchester transport policy as producing infrastructure that was ‘easy to deliver’ rather than what might be needed:

‘There’s a structural problem in the way that DfT [Department for Transport] handle this anyway. To tackle infrastructure issues at a city-region scale, requires you to think in decades, and DfT’s funding is dribs and drabs of short-term, “Here’s your advance £9 million, here’s the rest of the £23 million, there’s a top-up of £7 million,” and you didn’t even know when it was coming sometimes. Inevitably that means that someone like TfGM, “What do we spend it on?” Things like cycle hubs are quite easy to turn around in 18 months and just stick them in and job’s done. Proper grown-up infrastructure questions require a lot longer’.

This produced a culture whereby although there was strategic orientation, implementation was seen as an isolated process. According to a local transport official in Greater Manchester:

‘In terms of delivery we always see pieces’.

This points to the difficulty of a lack of coordination between different projects. This was summarised by a local cycling interest who also had previously had a policy role:

‘What there isn’t, there’s no co-ordination, and the part of the problem with this stuff, particularly cycling, it crosses about six different bits, even within one council…there’s highways, there’s planning, there’s leisure, there’s public health, there’s dah, dah, dah and there’s no one person. Either at a political level or an officer level, there’s no one person who oversees this stuff’.

4) There was a lack of overall understanding of how experimental and fluid processes of implementation of sustainable transport projects took place.

The governance process in transport project implementation often involved a range of social interests and there was general uncertainty about how the process operated. A local authority official suggested:

‘it’s hard to know [how implementation works], because the structure is constantly, it’s like fluid, it’s always changing, we don’t know where things are taken’.

For one respondent from the transport authority in Greater Manchester, its governing role was seen as working with that fluidity rather than to govern in a fundamentally different way:

‘I mean yes we don’t want to get back into the nuts and bolts of very detailed design, I think our job here is more in terms of design guides, code of practice, promotion, approval of overall programmes. So we’ll put forward the bids, collect the aspirations from the districts, give them a push and a prod where necessary, but having a strategic overview’.
5) Though there were processes ‘evaluating’ sustainable transport projects, capturing the learning from the wide range of different projects and governance interests and using mechanisms to feed this back into future decision-making was limited.

There is an issue about how knowledge of and learning about transport interventions is built at a Greater Manchester level. As both a local authority official and a representative of a local cycling group suggested:

‘it’s just hard to grasp what’s been delivered, how successful it is. I mean I wouldn’t really know how successful LSTF has been for Manchester. There’s a difference between saying you’ve engaged 1,000 or 10,000 businesses compared to what have you delivered and what’s the outcome’.

‘This opens up a huge can of worms. The honest answer is they can’t’.

Though there are multiple processes of ‘evaluation’ of projects, which include – variably – use of follow-up questionnaires on projects, different forms of official data, and a small research capacity in TfGM, there remains an issue of both coordination and of corporate memory.

‘It’s something that we face all the time, even before the austerity started. People would leave or get a different job or be promoted or demoted or fired or what have you, there’s little corporate memory’.

In short, there are weak institutional mechanisms for capturing learning about sustainable transport at a local Greater Manchester level. This makes the easily replicability of a project such as the cycle hub more difficult. What this tells us is that whilst there is significant local experimentation on sustainable transport in Greater Manchester there needs to be more effective ways of learning from this learning in terms both of projects and also wider lessons for sustainable transport at a city scale. Though it is sustainable transport projects that are presented as innovations in Greater Manchester, perhaps the key is that it is institutional innovation to capture the learning from local experimentation that is missing.

These LTSF initiatives are intended to contribute to a reduction in the number of car journeys in Greater Manchester through the provision of alternative modes of, particularly, short distance travel and to connect sites of employment with areas of social deprivation. They also aim to make ‘smarter’, more efficient use of existing mobility systems. The Cycle Hub initiative specifically intended to encourage greater cycle commuting. From that point of view it promotes an alternative to dominant modes of commuting in Greater Manchester\(^{19}\). Yet, it is promoted by the incumbent transport actor (TfGM) collaborating with a dominant property owner in the city (Pathway A). In addition to the key actor being the incumbent there has been some consultative involvement of cycling and sustainability groups. Yet, the focus of transformation in the Cycle Hub example is not on substitution or replacement but rather is to attempt to link an intervention in new cycling infrastructure to a wider attempt to build greater use of cycling as a commuter mode (Pathway B). In terms of the implementation of the Hub this was achieved reasonably rapidly (Pathway A). Yet, in terms of the effects of it as an intervention that contributes to a deeper cultural change in commuter cycling patterns this is difficult to assess as it is part of more systemic change. It is also likely to be some time before

\(^{19}\) 4.4, 4.5
this can be kind of change can be effectively assessed (Pathway B). Thus, although it is possible to set out how many users of the Hub there are and to make assessments of the numbers of commuter journeys they ‘replace’ (Pathway A) the kinds of broader changes envisaged in the aims of the Cycle Hub contributing to 10% modal share for cycling by 2025 in Greater Manchester are much more difficult to assess (Pathway B).
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Transport for Greater Manchester, (2011a), Local Sustainable Transport Fund - Large Project Bid, June.

Transport for Greater Manchester, (2011b), Local Sustainable Transport Greater Manchester’s Large Project Bid, Business Case, December.


Warriner, S., (2014), Transport Budget Briefing, Town Hall, Manchester, Director of Finance & Corporate Services 21 January, TfGM.
Appendix 1:

Case Study Proforma Questions

Background of the Initiative and Overview

0.1 Data sheet: We suggest that the initial questionnaire provided for each case can work as data sheet preceding each case study report. The questionnaire can hence be updated an enriched based on the findings and added to the report for a quick and illustrative overview.

0.2 Please provide an overview of the initiative (executive summary). And include a timeline of the most important events.

This part should work as introduction to the case study enabling the reader and analyst to understand the content of the case, what the outcomes were and what major insight for the aims of Pathways could be derived. Hence it is important to locate the case within the general development of the domain in the specific country and if possible provide findings from the literature on the state of the domain/innovation in general.

0.3 What is/was the general background of the case? (is there an overarching development, trend, political issue, etc. that spurred the initiative?)

It is important to learn if there we general developments in the case’s environment that led to the emergence of the initiative or influenced its progress. A focus should be on country specific developments and how norms, habits, social practices and the social context shape preferences and decisions.

M. Methods applied

This section should inform the reader about the specific methods applied, quality of data etc. The following questions might be helpful:

M.1 Which methods were used in data collection?

M.2 Which data were collected?

M.3 Which instruments did you use to analyse the data?

M.4 Were there problems regarding reliability and validity? What has been done to amend these?
In-detail description of the case

1. Gestation period

1.1. When and where did the initiative form? Were there motivators for action?
The question aims at information on the time and place of the formation of the initiative. E.g. the need for the initiative might have existed already some time before a first mover started it. It is possible that some kind of triggering event acted as starting point.

1.2. What was the first idea and the first goal of the initiative?
Initiatives often form in order to improve a current situation or to offer a solution to a perceived problem. Therefore, in a first step it is important to find out, what the reason underlying the initiative was and what the respective goals were.

1.3. Who was (were) the first mover(s)? What enabled him/her/them?
The first mover or initiator of the initiative can for example be the person who first had the idea on which the initiative is based. In any case, the first mover perceives that he or she is capable to take action and to realise the goal. The first mover does not necessarily have to be a single person but can instead be a group of people and/or organizations. Where there any characteristics like special knowledge making him/ her/ them especially suitable for being first mover?

1.4. How did the first action group form? What size did it have?
Please describe the process in which the initiative acquired its first members. How many members were they and who were they (names if possible, qualification, motivation)?

1.5. What did the first plan of resource assembly and allocation look like?
This part focuses on how the initiative initially organized itself and e.g. how financial resources were planned for the development and implementation of the initiative, how many persons were working for it etc. It is entirely possible that there was no initial plan but that the initiative emerged through some informal momentum. In that case it would be important to learn how the organization and resource allocation process evolved informally.

1.6. What concrete measures were included in the first action plan?
Measures stated in the first action plan could be preparatory steps such as the development of a network with distinct steps to approach different stakeholders, develop partnerships, internal organisational issues, etc.. It is possible that steps already belonging to the implementation and actual carrying out were included in the plan.

1.7. What was the role of governance in this period?: Who directed the initiative?
Was there governmental participation, support or opposition? Who was targeted, what measures were applied and on what level (national, EU vs. global)?
1.8. Did you find any other relevant events/occurrences/details in the initiation period not covered by one of the questions above?
Have there been any events in the initiation period that determined important steps or measures in the period that are not covered by the former questions? Which were they? What was their contribution?

2. Development period

2.1. How long did this period approximately last?

2.2. When (after what time since the first mover became active) did agents take first preparatory actions?
To answer this question, an estimate on how long the gestation period lasted should be given. Was there a specific event at which the first movers felt the time for going public had come? How was that point determined?

2.3. What were the first steps in this period?
The first steps could for example be the preparatory steps mentioned in 1.6. Organisational issues could for example be the search for a location, for personnel etc. Besides a list of first steps, this question aims to detect issues neglected by the initiative that later turned out to be important.

2.4. How were resources gathered?
After having made a plan of what resources are needed in the gestation period, in this period, the action group needs to gather its resources. How was that performed? Which resources were they? What were the effects on the initiative?

2.5. Who was affected by the initiative in this phase and how did stakeholder involvement take place?
This question addresses which members of the local society were affected by the initiative and how they were addressed and involved in the process. Stakeholders can be citizens (either individual or organised in groups), organisations, companies, and municipal organisations, etc. While some of the stakeholders might have profited from the initiative, others might have been negatively influenced or might have even feel threatened. Some stakeholders might as well have been affected, but did not care about the initiative and are therefore not visible to the action group.

2.6. Was there support or barriers? In what way and by whom?
This questions aim at the reactions the initiative face from external sources. Which support and which barriers did the initiative receive/have to face? Support and barriers can both be found on different levels. While there can be legislative matters e.g. laws promoting emission reduced traffic in city centres, they can as well be of financial or an idealistic nature.

2.7. **Were there frictions between the initiation and the proliferation period?**
E.g. did important members change? Did the initiative’s members discover that they had missed something that needed immediate response? Etc.

2.8. **Was a reconfiguration of plans and goals necessary? Why?**
When the first mover or group of first movers starts to articulate their goal and the initiative is exposed to external influences, the initial plan might be altered. Reasons for this can be

2.9. **What changes were there?**
This question can be answered comparing the initial plan and goal with the new, altered ones. The focus point should be on the difference between them and why the change was seen as a necessity, advantage or chance.

2.10. **Who were the main drivers in this period? Were there changes in the personnel or organisation of the initiative?**
Not only plans and goals of an initiative can change, persons (or groups/organizations) or organization might change as well. Some people involved in the initiative might lose interest, others might stop their involvement due to a lack of time or other, personal reasons, while still others join, etc.

2.11. **What was the role of governance in this period?: Who directed the initiative? Was there governmental participation, support or opposition? Who was targeted, what measures were applied and on what level (national, EU vs. global)?**

2.12. **Any other relevant findings in the proliferation period not covered by one of the questions above:**

3. **Implementation period (Termination/Diffusion)**

3.1. **How long did this period approximately last?**
3.2. Who were the main drivers in this period? Did they change with regard to the earlier periods?

3.3. What were the steps of implementation?
Which practical steps of action were taken to implement the initiative on the ground? The answer to this question therefore should not only address the means themselves, but as well the differences and as well issues neglected by the initiative that in the future revealed to have been important.

3.4. Did the plans of the initiative proof to be feasible? If not, what was the reason?
As this period is basically about taking operational action feasibility equals the success or failure of the initiative. To prevent later initiatives from failing, it is important to analyse the reasons why plans did not work out as planned and why this was not foreseeable and lead to a change of plan and/or actions. E.g. lack of finance or institutional back-up.

3.5. Were there frictions between this and the earlier periods?
E.g. did important members change? Did the initiative’s members discover that they had missed something that needed immediate response? Etc.

3.6. Was a reconfiguration of plans and goals necessary? Why?
When the first mover or group of first movers starts to articulate their goal and the initiative is exposed to external influences, the initial plan might be altered. Reasons for this can be

3.7. Which changes occurred?
This question can be answered comparing the initial plan and goal with the new, altered ones. The focus point should be on the difference between them and why the change was seen as a necessity, advantage or chance.

3.8. Was there support or barriers? In what way?
Not only in the proliferation period, but as well in the determination period is it possible for the initiative to receive support or to be confronted with barriers. As possibly more stakeholders become aware of the initiative during implementation, this point is very important for the outcome. New alliances as well as oppositions can form. Support / opposition may change and should be described. Who were the supporters/opponents in this period? What changes were there? Did support/opposition increase or decrease? How did the network evolve, etc.?

3.9. Who was affected by the initiative in this phase and how did stakeholder involvement take place?
This question addresses which members of the local society were affected by the initiative and how they were addressed and involved in the process. Stakeholders can be citizens (either individual or organised in groups), organisations, companies, and municipal organisations, etc. While some of the stakeholders might have profited from the initiative, others might have been negatively influenced or might have even feel threatened. Some stakeholders might as well have been affected, but did not care about the initiative and are therefore not visible to the action group.

3.10. **What was the role of governance in this period?** Who directed the initiative? Was there governmental participation, support or opposition? Who was targeted, what measures were applied and on what level (national, EU vs. global)?

3.11. **What was the outcome of the initiative?** Was it successful or did it fail?
The outcome is to be assessed on to level: the first focus is on the initiative itself: In case of success information should be given with regard to **scale, scope, speed and depth acquired**. However, there might be cases in which the initiative did not meet the goals set before the start of the determination period but still seems to have been successful in some other regard in retrospect. This would of course be very interesting as well. A focus should then be put on how it was possible to change plans and actions during the implementation and what the final differences between the plans and the result were. Also, an initiative might still be ongoing and does not have a fixed end-point, then it would be important to find a reasonable end-point for the investigation. The second focus needs to be set on the environment of the initiative. A first evaluation of effects on socio-technological dimension is already included in the scope analysis. This point now aims at a clear assessment of how the initiative affected its surrounding with regard to a possible development to niche level.

3.12. **If it was successful, has it been replicated?** Did it come to diffusion/spill over?
With a view to upsaling this question addresses whether the initiative stayed on a low regional level, diffused to other regions, was able to establish a niche or if it just stayed a single phenomenon, not diffusing at all. If the initiative vanished after some time this would as well be the place to state it.

3.13. **Any other relevant details in the determination period not covered by one of the questions above:**

4. **Summary/Synthesis:**

4.1. Please prove a short summary of the case and your findings.
4.2. In what ways did your initiative deviate from the ideal type?
If you compare your findings to the ideal type, are there major deviations? Can you explain these? (E.g. Overlap or leapfrogging of periods, altogether different process, etc.)

4.3. How would you relate this initiative to Pathway A or B? How do you judge the momentum of it?
   How does the case fit into the different Pathways and why?

4.4. How would you relate this initiative to Pathway A or B?
   How does the case fit into the different Pathways and why?

4.5. What results are significant to the PATHWAYS project and why? (WP 3 and PATHWAYS in general)
   What are the potential major contributions of the case with regard to the research questions of WP 3:
   - Who were the special interest groups at stake
   - What enabled or disabled the implementation of this initiative in the real life?
   - Which implications for policy can be drawn? (How does policy design need to be rearranged in order to get stakeholders on board at any level?)
   Are there direct implications to other parts of PATHWAYS? E.g. What does this case imply with regard to multi-level integration in WP 4?

4.6. How do you judge the momentum of the initiative (or niche, if you identified one)?

4.7. What are the implications to be drawn for initiatives in general from your findings?
   With all the limitations that result from investigating a single case, are there findings that you find are exemplary and should be considered on a general basis?
### Appendix 2: Timeline and key events

#### Gestation (2009-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>New governing arrangements proposed for Greater Manchester – including transport. Alongside new arrangements sustainable transport framed as being predominantly about economic growth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2011 | New arrangements formalised with transport governing delegated to Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM). Production of statutory Local Transport Plan (LTP) for 2011-2015 - led by TfGM. The central goals were to:  
  * Set out Greater Manchester’s transport spending plans and priorities to 2015 as part of a 15 year strategy.  
  * Improve public transport options, particularly for short journeys, reduce car use, develop access to commuter sites. |
| 2011 | Recognised need, among ‘transport community’ to identify and win resources to translate the LTP. |

#### Development (2011-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2011</td>
<td>National government set out £560 million Local Sustainable Transport Fund to promote greater local use of public transport, walking and cycling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>TfGM (via GMCA) submitted a large project bid to LSTF to address getting people to work - particularly from economically deprived areas. Greater Manchester also received £4.9m project for a commuter cycling project in July 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November/December 2011</td>
<td>TfGM undertakes a ‘full review’ of its bid to ensure a fit between the bid and LSTF objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2012</td>
<td>Review of proposals undertaken by Expert Panel and where all Large Project bidders were interviewed by the Expert Panel and Department for Transport (DFT) Officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2012</td>
<td>DfT confirmed that Greater Manchester was successful in securing £32.4 million of funding with additional local contributions of over £20m. This was in addition to the first tranche of £4.9 of LSTF funding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| June 2012 | The Greater Manchester proposal consisted of four components and a previously submitted fifth component:  
  1. Developing sustainable access to key destinations and transport hubs.  
  2. A supporting sustainable choices component.  
  3. A smarter travel component.  
  4. Developing capacity for community transport.  
  5. The forerunner element promoted commuter cycling. |

#### Implementation (2012-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012-2015</td>
<td>TfGM had responsibility for overseeing implementation of LSTF bid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2015</td>
<td>Five elements of work (set out in the Development phase) were to be delivered by partners, by TfGM or through combinations. Each element involved numerous local interventions, which each involved a range of actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Taking one example intervention - the LSTF Commuter Cycling initiative of 10-13 Cycle Hubs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2012 – November 2012</td>
<td>Design and development of the infrastructure undertaken after the funding had been won.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2012</td>
<td>Regional hub in central Manchester opened. In governance terms this was a public-private partnership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2012 onwards</td>
<td>Various design amendments to the Hub.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3</td>
<td>Research Institute: SCI/MIoIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Person:</td>
<td>Mike Hodson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-Mail:</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Michael.hodson@manchester.ac.uk">Michael.hodson@manchester.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone:</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Part I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short summary of the case (aim/character):</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>‘Implementation’ as ‘Conditioned Experimenting’</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainable Transport and Greater Manchester</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This case challenges the commonly held view that local experimentation is a 'bottom-up' process and suggests that local experimentation can be strongly conditioned and structured by a combination of priorities of national and urban tiers of governance and limited local capacity to achieve these priorities. Local experimentation, in this view, is a response to national and urban priorities rather than locally embedded priorities.

To illustrate this argument, the case focuses on different transport projects that are being mobilised in Greater Manchester in pursuing national and urban priorities, particularly the building of a suite of Greater Manchester transport projects funded by the national Local Sustainable Transport Fund and other forms of funding. These projects involve five components:

(i) ‘Sustainable access to key destinations and transport hubs’, where access to town centres, with their concentrations of employment and to railway, bus and Metrolink stations is promoted through particularly new cycling infrastructure to increase ‘access trips’ (last/first mile) being made by sustainable modes of transport;

(ii) ‘Supporting sustainable choices’, where there are efforts to shape smarter choices in relation to commuter travel. This includes cycling training, walking training, travel planning at key destinations and at job centres;

(iii) ‘Smarter travel’, which aims to build efficiency and reliability across modes through developing integrated smart ticketing and improving network efficiency through selective priority for late running buses, delivering real-time data to enable real-time management of the local network and developing cycle traffic counting and local carbon monitoring systems; and

(iv) ‘Enabling community transport’, to improve and expand the provision of community transport across Greater Manchester, particularly from areas of deprivation to key sites of employment.

(v) Promoting commuter cycling through cycle training and information and infrastructure elements including membership-based cycle hubs that would include secure cycle parking, lockers, toilets, showers and changing cubicles and also cycle
compounds for commuter cyclists at, for example, rail and bus station

These projects are disconnected from embedded capacity to implement them. Efforts to implement them cannot be understood without appreciating their interrelationships with the construction of transport governance arrangements in Greater Manchester.

Limited in-house operational capacity in the strategic tier of governing means that embedded, latent capacity has to be constantly mobilised, configured, made and re-made in processes of local experimentation. National and urban priorities condition implementation predicated on the constant construction of capacity through individual ‘experiments’ - ‘conditioned experiments’. This case sets out five elements of conditioned experimentation.

| Location of case | The projects were/are being undertaken at various different locations within Greater Manchester. The governance context is Greater Manchester. |
| Website(s) of case (if applicable): | Given the different projects and the fragmented governance context numerous websites that are useful to help piece together understanding of the case: |
| Greater Manchester Local Sustainable Transport Fund projects | http://www.tfgm.com/journey_planning/LTP3/Pages/LSTF.aspx |
| Greater Manchester Combined Authority | http://www.agma.gov.uk/transport/index.html |
| Transport for Greater Manchester | http://www.tfgm.com/Pages/default.aspx |
Part-funded by a national Local Sustainable Transport Fund

Cycling

| Case duration: (from...to...; or: since:...) | The case is not rigidly bounded temporally. There is a historical context to the development of both the governance arrangements and the projects which the case details. That said, in following the Gestation, Development and Implementation structure the case focuses on 2009-2015. |
| Scope of the initiative (city programme, regional, city district...): | The scope of the initiative is a formal city-regional (i.e. metropolitan scale) programme, dependent on national funding, with implementation of projects across different sites in the metropolitan area. In this sense, the initiative is multi-scalar (national, city-regional, local). |
| Is a specific technology addressed or involved? Which? | The following technologies are involved: cycle hubs, cycle routes, cycle training, cycle storage facilities; walking routes; walking training; smart ticketing; community buses. |
| Domain of the Case: | Mobility |
| Are there other domains of the project also addressed by your case? Which? How? | The case is primarily in the mobility domain. |
| How is your case positioned with regard to the prevailing regime or emerging niches? | The case addresses a range of projects including cycling projects, bus lane projects, a smartcard ticketing project, efforts to address the transport ‘gap’ between homes and transport hubs and transport hubs and sites of employment. Clearly, this means that there are a range of initiatives which can be associated with a specific regime - e.g. cycling projects with the cycling regime, bus projects with the bus regime etc. Yet, efforts to develop cycling projects and bus lanes, for example, are also intended to strengthen commuter travel options and, in doing so, have consequences for the automobility regime. There are also initiatives that seek to bridge multiple regimes and to reconfigure relationships between them - e.g. smartcard ticketing. 

What is interesting is that in Greater Manchester ‘niches’ are not seen as individual initiatives as such but sit within wider strategic plans for long-term transformation of the area’s transport networks. Many niche developments are being experimented with locally with the aspiration - |
As addressed in the kick-off meeting we suggest that Pathway A and B represent stylized types at the end of a continuum. Your case may therefore also be “rather A or B” instead of exactly representing one of the types. In that case, it would be very interesting to learn if there are deviations of specific interest (“Focus is A but Speed and Depth work in terms of B”).

| What is the role and contribution of the case with regard to the "PATHWAYS"-project in terms of the WPs 1,2 and 3? (Just a short comment for each.) | It is difficult to say at this stage how the case relates to WPs1, 2 and 3. This will obviously need to be part of a much longer discussion. But to begin a process of contributing to that discussion:

WP1 – this case, through the messy processes of transitions in action, provides a stark contrast to attempts to provide order through IAMs. Perhaps we should see this contrast as a strength. The modelling sets out possible futures whereas these local processes of attempts to realise futures highlight issues that inhibit and enhance such processes.

WP2 – this case – and others in WP3 - have the potential to bring a stronger spatial and scalar dimension to the temporal analysis of WP2.

WP3 – the case helps us understand the strengths and the limits of local experimentation and to recognise that ‘local’ experimentation is conditioned by ‘non-local’ priorities. |

| Where would you classify this case / this initiative in terms of the two pathways (A or B)? As a help you may first “tick” the boxes below. | These projects are intended to contribute to a reduction in the number of car journeys in Greater Manchester through the provision of alternative modes of, particularly, short distance travel and to connect sites of employment with areas of social deprivation (Pathway B). They also aim to make ‘smarter’, more efficient use of existing systems (Pathway A). |

| Pathway A: Technical component substitution | Pathway B: Broader regime Transformation |
| Key actors | Incumbent actors (often existing industry actors and national governments) | New entrants, including social movements, civil society actors |
| Focus of | Focus on | Technological changes are combined with |

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20 As addressed in the kick-off meeting we suggest that Pathway A and B represent stylized types at the end of a continuum. Your case may therefore also be “rather A or B” instead of exactly representing one of the types. In that case, it would be very interesting to learn if there are deviations of specific interest (“Focus is A but Speed and Depth work in terms of B”).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>replacing technologies and management types by better ones with the same function</th>
<th>wider behavioural and cultural changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Easier to implement in the short run</td>
<td>Depends on wider societal change, therefore slower in the beginning and more risky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth and Scope</td>
<td>Changes are implemented only in as far as they meet the societal goals</td>
<td>Broader societal involvement and changes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Part II

#### Size and character of the initiatives

**Which kinds of actors and stakeholders are involved (e.g. action groups, citizen initiatives, companies, NGO’s, governmental organizations, etc. Please also provide their names.**

There is a wide range of actors involved in these initiatives.

The following actors are important in (a) creating the conditions for transport initiatives in Greater Manchester, (b) building a vision of sustainable and low carbon transport in Greater Manchester and (c) the initiatives that will be developed to achieve that vision:

- UK national government, particularly Department for Transport
- Greater Manchester Combined Authority
- Transport for Greater Manchester
- Transport for Greater Manchester Committee

Within this context cycling, walking, bus and other projects mean that a large number of actors are important, including, for example: Transport for Greater Manchester, British Cycling, Sustrans, local cycling groups, Network Rail, train, bus and Metrolink operators, local authorities and others.

**What can we learn about the role of governance in your case? Have there e.g. been agents (individuals and/or organizations) that especially**

The role of governance is critical in this case. Particularly important is the multi-scalarity of governance and its role in local experiments. Local experiments often assemble a wide range of interests. These interests often do not correspond with the local area of the experiment. So, although the interests involved in this case included local political elites and the metropolitan transport authority, there was also the strong involvement of national government and a range of interests associated with rail, bus and cycling at national, metropolitan and local scales as well as community groups and charities. What is important in terms of governance is the relationships between strategic priorities and their realization. Strategic priorities were strongly dominated by national
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<td>facilitated, managed or dominated the case?</td>
<td>government and the metropolitan transport authority. Their realization required the construction of local capacity.</td>
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<td>How much money is (approximately) involved, e.g. 1 million, 10 million 100 million euro? (if applicable) How is it financed?</td>
<td>This is not straightforward. Specifically the Local Sustainable Transport Funding (LSTF) for Greater Manchester was over £37m of national funding supported by over £20m of local funding. The case, though, demonstrates how initiatives are often not directly related to one stream of funding but requires stitching together streams of funding. An important part of the case is understanding how the vision and initiatives stitch together different streams of funding over time and what stories they tell to leverage this funding.</td>
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<td>Which element(s) of socio-technical configurations does the initiative aim to change (e.g. technology, infrastructure, consumer behaviour, policy, cultural meaning, local infrastructure); in what way – What is the innovation?</td>
<td>The case addressed a number of these issues.</td>
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<td>Please provide a short delineation of the process: Who started it? Who joined? Has there been a change in leadership? Has the case reached its goals? What were the outcomes (intended or unintended)?</td>
<td>Of importance for understanding the context of the initiatives are two documents. The 2011 Local Transport Plan and a 2011 funding bid to the national Local Sustainable Transport Fund (LSTF). These documents between them provide the starting context for understanding the five components set out above. LSTF funding runs until 2015. The Local Transport Plan can be reviewed as is necessary and has a time horizon to 2015. There are also other timelines such as a Greater Manchester cycling strategy to 2025. Overall leadership is provided by the metropolitan transport authority, Transport for Greater Manchester. They provide strategic direction for transport developments in Greater Manchester (through the Local Transport Plan). They were central to the processes of developing a funding bid to the Local Sustainable Transport Fund. In terms of local processes of implementation they work in three ways: (a) through public-private partnerships; (b) through in-house capacity; (c) through putting</td>
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<td>Were there any policy interventions that occurred?</td>
<td>The case addresses the multi-scalar construction of sustainable transport policy and efforts to ‘implement’ it. There is a longer-term story here of the dynamics between national transport priorities and Greater Manchester and the ways this has shaped (or not) the development of a sustainable transport response in Greater Manchester. More specifically, there is a statutory requirement for Greater Manchester to produce a Local Transport Plan; it has established a Transport Fund; and national government established the LSTF.</td>
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| Which barriers and conflicts did the initiative face?                   | The issues faced by initiatives can be understood through the concept of ‘conditioned experimentation’ that was developed in the case study.  
1. There was wide recognition from a wide range of interests involved that initiatives were ‘experimental’ and that it wasn’t clear how processes of development would unfold.  
2. Yet, the ability to exercise discretion in initiatives was limited by prior commitments to national government; particularly given that the bidding process to national government came prior to design of infrastructure; where there was subsequently limited discretion in the implementation process as allusions to national government requirements were made; and where, sometimes, what resulted was seen to be poorly designed infrastructure.  
3. These tensions between national and Greater Manchester priorities created a structural problem whereby funding was relatively short-term and packaged into ‘drips’ of funding. This conditioned a view whereby the types of infrastructure that were developed were those that were seen as ‘easier to deliver’, to meet funding and timescale priorities. This produced a culture where, although there was strategic orientation, delivery was seen in ‘pieces’ and produced a lack of coordination between initiatives.  
4. This resulted in a fluidity in implementation where there were a multiplicity of relationships and uncertainty in terms of organising ‘implementation’. But where there was no real desire to challenge this uncertainty but rather efforts to work with it.  
5. This created a difficulty in capturing fragmented knowledge. That is to say, among all these fragmented initiatives, and the individual lessons learned from them, it was difficult to coordinate overall lessons about transport initiatives at Greater Manchester level. Though there was the use of follow-up questionnaires on projects, different forms of official data, small research capacity in the transport authority there was no real coordination or corporate memory. |
<p>| Has the initiative found replications?                                   | One of the important findings of this case is that often, even in Greater Manchester (i.e. the same metropolitan area), similar initiatives (e.g. bike hubs) were not easily replicable. This links to the issue of how learning |</p>
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<th>(was it picked up anywhere else, planned or spontaneously?)</th>
<th>occurs, set out below. It is difficult to imagine, given the particularities of the Greater Manchester governance context, that there is easy replicability of what is going on there in other contexts. That said, projects in Greater Manchester are funded by the national LSTF. This being so, other UK cities and urban areas are also recipients of funds and it would be a useful exercise to understand the different ways in which these initiatives have been organised in various contexts.</th>
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<td>How did learning occur within the case?</td>
<td>Refer to Barriers and Conflicts, above. Learning occurred within a different set of initiatives but there was no effective institutional mechanism for coordinating learning across the initiatives.</td>
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<td>Which sources of information and methods did you use in your case study?</td>
<td>This case is interesting because of its complexity in bringing together (1) the development of governance structures, (2) the setting out of priorities for city-regional sustainable transport and (3) efforts to translate that vision through initiatives. Engagement with these issues was via:</td>
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| | • The construction of a conceptual framework which brought together the issues of urban governance and urban experimentation.  
• There is a wide range of policy and strategy documents available across the Greater Manchester agencies. These were accessed as were relevant national documents. These addressed both the longer-term development of vision and governance and the development of the initiatives.  
• These kinds of documents present particular representations of the initiatives and to ‘get inside’ of these representations a programme of interviews (10) was undertaken with key interests across the governance context and the different initiatives. |

If you encounter any difficulties in filling in these questionnaires or you need additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us:

Holger: Holger.berg@wupperinst.org

Laura: laura.echternacht@wupperinst.org